Wyoming Law Review
Volume 14

Number 1

Article 5

January 2014

Property Law - Strong Armed at Arm's Length: The Role of
Comparable Easements in Condemnation Proceedings under
Wyoming's Amended Eminent Domain Laws
Bailey K. Schreiber

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr

Recommended Citation
Schreiber, Bailey K. (2014) "Property Law - Strong Armed at Arm's Length: The Role of Comparable
Easements in Condemnation Proceedings under Wyoming's Amended Eminent Domain Laws," Wyoming
Law Review: Vol. 14 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss1/5

This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Schreiber: Property Law - Strong Armed at Arm's Length: The Role of Comparab

Case Note
PROPERTY LAW—Strong Armed at Arm’s Length: The Role
of Comparable Easements in Condemnation Proceedings under
Wyoming’s Amended Eminent Domain Laws; Barlow Ranch, LP v.
Greencore Pipeline Co., 2013 WY 34, 301 P.3d 75 (Wyo. 2013)
Bailey K. Schreiber*
Introduction
In the early twentieth century, commenting on the governmental power to
take private property on the burgeoning western frontier, United States Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote that “there might be exceptional
times and places in which the very foundations of public welfare could not be
laid without requiring concessions from individuals to each other upon due
compensation.”1 The drafters of the Wyoming Constitution required landowners
make such concessions when they included a provision granting a category of
private entities the right to take private property for certain purposes, so long as
just compensation is provided.2 Eminent domain, as this power is known, was
historically extended to private companies in an effort to encourage development
of the state’s agricultural and mineral resources, and to foster economic progress.3
This provision remains unchanged to this day, though the question of determining
“just compensation” for condemned property lingers.
In 2007, the Wyoming Legislature amended the state’s eminent domain
laws to allow courts faced with the question of compensation for an easement
to consider the prices paid for other easements that were comparable in size,
type, and location so long as they were the result of arm’s length transactions.4 In
Barlow Ranch, LP v. Greencore Pipeline Co., the Wyoming Supreme Court held

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 2015. I would like to thank
Professors Alan Romero and Sam Kalen for taking the time to read and critique this piece and the
Wyoming Law Review editors for helping me through the writing process. I would also like to thank
the practitioners that answered my many questions and provided invaluable insight. Finally, thank
you Martin Sanders, Courtney Amerine and Hollis Ploen for the encouragement and welcome
diversions along the way.
Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (holding a Utah
statute that allowed a private mining operation to condemn a right-of-way for an aerial bucket line
over private property was constitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments).
1

Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 32, 33; Robert B. Keiter & Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming State
Constitution: A Reference Guide 67 (1993).
2

3

Keiter & Newcomb, supra note 2, at 67.

4

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-704(a)(iii)(B)-(C) (2013).
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that comparable easements are admissible to determine the fair market value of a
partial taking for a pipeline under certain circumstances.5
While the court reached the proper conclusion in Greencore, the court
expanded the definition of “arm’s length transactions” in a way that will lead
to chilled condemnation negotiations, an overall decrease in prices offered to
landowners for private takings, and an increase in condemnation litigation.6 This
Case Note first discusses the unusual nature of “private takings” in federal and
Wyoming law and then provides a summary of the holding and reasoning in
Greencore.7 The practical implications of the 2007 amendments and the Greencore
decision will be discussed, followed by recommendations on how to account for
these consequences.8

Background
Eminent Domain and Private Takings
The power to take private property for public use has been called “essential to
the life of the state.”9 The power of eminent domain is inherent to any sovereign,
including the United States and individual states therein.10 The taking of private
property by a public entity, or a private entity with the delegated authority, is
often viewed as necessary for the proper performance of governmental functions.11
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution explicitly recognizes
this power, while simultaneously limiting it in two ways. First, private property
may only be taken for public use.12 Second, private property may never be taken
without providing just compensation in return.13
5

2013 WY 34, ¶ 50, 301 P.3d 75, 91 (Wyo. 2013).

6

See infra notes 140–170 and accompanying text.

7

See infra notes 9–120 and accompanying text.

8

See infra notes 121–196 and accompanying text.

9

State of Ga. v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924).

Id. at 480; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)
(holding that when private property is taken for public use by a state court or Legislature without
providing just compensation, it is a violation of the U.S. Constitution Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process of law, thereby requiring states to comply with the Fifth Amendment just
compensation requirement); Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding
of the So-Called “Takings” Clause, 53 Hastings L.J. 1245, 1250 (2002) (discussing the origins and
nature of eminent domain).
10

11
City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. at 480; see United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518
(1883) (holding that the right of eminent domain is inherent in any sovereign and exists without
Constitutional recognition); Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878)
(stating the right to take private property for public uses appertains to independent government).
12
U.S. Const. amend. V (The Takings Clause states: “. . . nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.”).
13

Id.
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The United States Supreme Court interpreted the term “public use”
broadly, allowing government to take property for a wide range of purposes,
including roads, railroads, bridges, pipelines and, most recently, for economic
development.14 In Kelo v. City of New London, the Court considered whether a
city’s condemnation of private property in order to convey it for the purposes
of revitalizing a distressed economy satisfied “public use.”15 The Court held that
it did, stating that the public use requirement is broad, and includes takings of
private property that will be used directly by the public as well as those that
will provide economic benefits to the public generally.16 The Court has also held
that state governments may delegate to private entities the power to take private
property.17 It is generally accepted that a taking by such an entity is done for a
public purpose.18
Takings by private companies, or “private takings,” are common in the
Mountain West, where states explicitly grant the power to private entities by
constitutional provisions or statutes.19 One purpose of extending this power is
14
Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 478–79 (2005) (holding that the city’s
exercise of eminent domain power to promote economic development plan was a “public use” and
was therefore constitutional under the Fifth Amendment); Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain
After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 491, 493 (2006).
15

545 U.S. at 472.

16

Id. at 480.

Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 364 (1905) (holding that a private individual has the right
to condemn a right of way across neighbor’s property for the enlargement of an irrigation ditch
when the statute granting that right asserts the use to be public); Cline v. Kan. Gas & Elec. Co.,
260 F.2d 271, 273 (10th Cir. 1958) (“[T]he Legislature may delegate [the right to appropriate
private property] to another, provided that the property is to be devoted to public use, that there
is public necessity that it be taken for such use, and that provision is made for the payment of just
compensation.”). State governments may also limit the power of eminent domain by defining public
use more narrowly, either through statute or judicial decisions. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (emphasizing
that the Kelo decision does not preclude “any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of
the takings power” either through statutory or judicial measures); Cohen, supra note 14, at 511–12.
17

18
Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984) (refusing to engage in
debate over the “wisdom of takings” so long as the purpose of the Legislature is legitimate and not
irrational); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Subject to specific constitutional limitations,
when the Legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.
In such cases the Legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served
by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of Columbia, or
the States legislating concerning local affairs.”) (citation omitted); see Luxton v. N. River Bridge
Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529 (1894) (holding that Congress may delegate the power of eminent domain
by statute to a private company authorized to take private property for the purpose of building a
bridge); Cohen, supra, note 14, at 511–12; Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
Cornell L. Rev. 61, 77 (1986).

See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. II, § 14 (“Private property shall not be taken for private use
unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and except for reservoirs, drains,
flumes or ditches on or across the lands of others, for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or
sanitary purposes.”); Ariz. Const. art. II, § 17 (“Private property shall not be taken for private
use, except for private ways of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or ditches, on or across the lands
19
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to promote development of coal, oil, gas, and other natural resources.20 States,
in the infancy of statehood, were eager to grow local economies through the
development of mining, oil and gas development, forestry, and other industries.21
The United States Supreme Court found these purposes satisfy the public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.22 As one scholar wrote of the American
West, the “hardships of life in arid lands and mountain fastnesses, the nature of
the resource base, vast distances, and, above all, men’s impatience to force the
pace of economic development all seemed to overwhelm the remaining bulwarks
of legal-constitutional structure.”23 Because the power of eminent domain in the
hands of selected private entities served to foster expansion and utilization of the
region’s resources and promote economic growth in these fledgling states, it is
generally accepted that the public purpose requirement is satisfied.24
As a result, in many states, private companies may initiate a condemnation
proceeding against a landowner without involving state government.25 Because
the power of eminent domain is granted by law, courts generally do not question
of others for mining, agricultural, domestic, or sanitary purposes.”); Idaho Const. art. I, § 14
(Private property may be taken for public use for just compensation which is defined as “ use of
lands for the construction of reservoirs or storage basins, for the purpose of irrigation, or for rights
of way for the construction of canals, ditches, flumes or pipes, to convey water to the place of use
for any useful, beneficial or necessary purpose, or for drainage; or for the drainage of mines, or
the working thereof, by means of roads, railroads, tramways, cuts, tunnels, shafts, hoisting works,
dumps, or other necessary means to their complete development, or any other use necessary to
the complete development of the material resources of the state, or the preservation of the health
of its inhabitants.”); Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation and Resource Allocation by
Government: The United States 1789 –1910, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 232, 244 (1973); see Alexandra B.
Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U. Colo. L Rev. 651, 652 (2008).
20

Keiter & Newcomb, supra note 2, at 67; Klass, supra note 19, at 652.

See Sam Western, Pushed off the Mountain, Sold down the River: Wyoming’s Search
for Its Soul, 10 (2002) (arguing that Wyoming, even before it was a state, “bet on cattle, oil, coal
and gas to bring the state abundance”).
21

See Clark, 198 U.S. at 364 (stating that under some “peculiar condition of the soil or
climate, or other peculiarity of the state,” the power of eminent domain in the hands of private
entities may rise to a public use); Klass, supra note 19, at 652; Keiter & Newcomb, supra note 2, at
67; Scheiber, supra note 19, at 244.
22

23

Scheiber, supra note 19, at 244.

Id. at 249, n.57 (emphasizing the strategic importance of eminent domain in the hands of
private entities, the absence of which would have probably led to the foundering of such enterprises).
24

25
See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 126-814 (2013) (a “utility or [any petroleum or other pipeline]
company has the right of eminent domain and may condemn the easement required by the utility or
company); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-101 (2013) (“If any corporation formed for the purpose
of constructing a road, ditch, reservoir, pipeline, bridge, ferry, tunnel, telegraph line, railroad line,
electric line, electric plant, telephone line, or telephone plant is unable to agree with the owner for
the purchase of any real estate or right-of-way or easement or other right necessary or required for
the purpose of any such corporation for transacting its business or for any lawful purpose connected
with the operations of the company, the corporation may acquire title to such real estate or right-ofway or easement or other right in the manner provided by law for the condemnation of real estate
or right-of-way.”).
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whether the use is for a public purpose.26 The question then, is not whether the
taking can occur, but how much an individual must be compensated.27

Determining Just Compensation
Regardless of who is taking, just compensation is always required.28 The
Takings Clause “was designed to bar government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”29 Determining just compensation is not an easy task. The
United States Supreme Court has not established a rigid formula for determining
just compensation.30 Noting that the “just” requirement “derives as much content
from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of
property law,” the Court pointed to fair market value as the primary standard by
which to determine compensation.31 Fair market value is the value that a willing
but unobligated buyer would pay in cash to a willing but unobligated seller at the
time of the taking.32
Fair market value is itself not an easy figure to determine, and the method has
been criticized as not arriving at just compensation.33 For example, fair market
value fails to take into consideration subjective values an owner may have in his
property.34 It also does not generally account for activity on the property prior
See Laura A. Hanley, Judicial Battles Between Pipeline Companies and Landowners: It’s Not
Necessarily Who Wins, but by How Much, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 125, 158–159 (2000) (arguing that,
because there is really no question as to whether or not a private condemnor can take the property,
what determines who wins and loses is a question of compensation only); see supra notes 17–18, 22
and accompanying text.
26

27

Hanley, supra note 26, at 137.

28

U.S. Const. amend. V.

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd. ex rel.
Mayer, 906 F. Supp. 749, 769 (D.R.I. 1995) aff ’d sub nom. McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12
(1st Cir. 1996).
29

30

United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).

31

United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (citation omitted).

32

Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States., 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).

33

See infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.

Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (suggesting
that fair market value is not full compensation, for “market value is not the value that every owner
of property attaches to his property but merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his
property”); Steven J. Eagle, Protecting Property from Unjust Deprivation Beyond Takings: Substantive
Due Process, Equal Protection, and State Legislation, in Taking Sides on Takings Issues: Public
and Private Perspectives 507, 515 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); Janice Nadler & Shari
Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective
Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 713, 721 (2008) (discussing the role
subjective attachment has in an individual’s valuation of their property). But see Brian Angelo Lee,
Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 593,
649 (2013) (arguing that fair market value provides at least partial compensation for a significant
amount of condemnee’s subjective value).
34
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to condemnation, the cost of relocation, or destruction of a given business’s
good will.35 Furthermore, fair market value does not consider consequential
damages, which may arise at some distant point in the future, or any subjective
or emotional damages.36 Emotional damages may include what have been termed
“dignitary harms,” including feelings of outrage, resentment, and insult as a result
of condemnation.37 For these reasons, fair market value is regarded by some as an
inadequate means of determining just compensation.38
Determining fair market value in the context of a partial taking, which is
often what is obtained for the purposes of natural resource extraction, is even
more complicated.39 In the case of a partial taking, such as an easement to lay
a pipeline, the condemnor does not take the entire parcel. Instead, the right
to use the property is taken, while the owner retains title.40 The method used
by most jurisdictions to determine the value of an easement is the “before and
after” approach.41 Under this approach, compensation is the difference between
the fair market value of the property before the taking occurred and after, or
the “before and after” value.42 This approach is discussed in greater detail in the
following section.43

35
Marisa Fegan, Just Compensation Standards and Eminent Domain Injustices: An Under
examined Connection and Opportunity for Reform, 6 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 269, 288 (2007); Ann
E. Gergen, Why Fair Market Value Fails as Just Compensation, 14 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 181,
192 (1993).
36
Consequential damages are “losses that do not flow directly and immediately from an
injurious act but that result indirectly from the act.” Black’s Law Dictionary 445–46 (9th ed. 2009);
Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It is a well settled
principle of Fifth Amendment taking law, however, that the measure of just compensation is the
fair value of what was taken, and not the consequential damages the owner suffers as a result of the
taking.”); Fegan, supra note 35, at 288.
37

Nadler & Diamond, supra note 34, at 721.

38

See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.

4A Nichols on Eminent Domain, Ch. 14, § 14.01[2] (Julius L. Sackman, 3rd ed.)
(noting that, while conceptually determining compensation for a partial taking is straightforward,
application of the principles can be complex).
39

Albert N. Allen, The Appraisal of Easements, Right of Way Magazine, Nov./Dec. 2001 at
41; Edward McKirdy, Partial Takings, Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation, SF54
ALI-ABA 215, 217 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, Jan. 9, 1992).
40

Nichols, supra note 39, § 14.01[2]; Alan T. Ackerman & Noah Eliezer Yanich, Just Compensation and the Framers’ Intent: A Constitutional Approach to Road Construction Damages in Partial
Taking Cases, 77 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 241, 246 (2000); Leslie Pickering Francis, Eminent Domain
Compensation in Western States: A Critique of the Fair Market Value Model, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 429,
472–73; McKirdy, supra note 40, at 217.
41

42

Nichols, supra note 39, § 14.01[2].

43

See infra notes 48–58 and accompanying text.
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Eminent Domain in Wyoming
When the Wyoming Constitution was ratified in 1889, it included two sections
regarding the state’s power of eminent domain. Article I, Section 32 provides:
Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by
consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and
for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across the lands
of others for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or sanitary
purposes, nor in any case without due compensation.44
Article 1, Section 33 supplements Section 32, stating: “Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation.”45 In
Wyoming, like many western states, the power of eminent domain was extended
to private entities for the purpose of promoting settlement and the development
of the state’s resources.46 These two sections, along with the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s interpretations and some other limited statutes, governed condemnation
proceedings in Wyoming for almost one hundred years.47
During this time, Wyoming courts used the “before and after” valuation
method to determine the price of partial takings for pipeline easements.48 In
Continental Pipe Line Co. v. Irwin Livestock Co., the Wyoming Supreme Court
held, in the instance of a partial taking, “just compensation is the difference
between the fair market value of the entire parcel before the taking and that after

Wyo. Const. art. I, § 32. In Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, the Wyoming Supreme Court
held that “mining” includes oil and gas development. 603 P.2d 406, 412 (Wyo. 1979). While
this case note does not address the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, it is important to note that the Wyoming Supreme Court has held that a taking must
be in the “public interest.” Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & Irrigation
Co., 131 P. 43, 57 (Wyo. 1913). The court has also held that, though article 32 ostensibly gave
private entities the power of eminent domain for private use, “it was evidently adopted upon the
theory that the public would be sufficiently benefited by the taking for such a purpose to warrant
the taking.” Id. See supra note 18 and accompanying text for more information regarding the public
use requirement of the Takings Clause.
44

45

Wyo. Const. art. I, § 33.

46

Keiter & Newcomb, supra note 2, at 67.

There were a number of statutes passed prior to the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act that
address takings in limited circumstances, such as a taking involving public building and school
sites and public utility plants and facilities (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-101 through -110 (repealed
1981)); railroads (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-201 through -210 (repealed 1981)); roads, ditches and
flumes, pipe, electric transmission, telephone and telegraph lines (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-301
through -303 (repealed 1981)); ways of necessity for certain purposes (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26401 through -405 (repealed 1981)). These were all repealed in 1981 when the Legislature passed the
more comprehensive Wyoming Eminent Domain Act.
47

Randall T. Cox, Easements, Access & Eminent Domain: A Review
144–45, (2nd ed. 2001); see supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
48
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the taking.”49 In Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, a case in which an oil company
sought an easement on a private road, the court held the trial court erred by
allowing opinions of just compensation which were not tied to a “before and after”
valuation of the property, but were instead based on speculation and conjecture.50
Many landowners were frustrated with the “before and after” method
of valuation. They believed it was inadequate and unfair.51 It was difficult for
landowners to show that partial takings, such as laying a pipeline, caused a
significant diminution in property values.52 However, landowners could show
affronts of other kinds: surveyors would enter their property without permission,
landmen would make low offers and threaten litigation, and projects would
divide lands and impair views.53 Juries recognized these damages and would
award substantial verdicts for the landowners, only to have them overturned.54
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court would apply the “before and after”
method of valuation, arriving at a lower price.55
This left landowners, who believed rights of property ownership to be
sacrosanct, feeling disrespected and disappointed.56 The increasing use of eminent
domain by private companies, and the accelerating market values of land,
made landowners even more frustrated with the “before and after” method of
valuation.57 In 1981, the Wyoming Legislature responded to these concerns by
passing the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act.58 Unsurprisingly, much of the Act
addresses methods and procedures for determining just compensation.59

49
625 P.2d 214, 216 (Wyo. 1981); superseded by statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-704 (2007),
as recognized in Barlow Ranch, LP v. Greencore Pipeline Co., 2013 WY 34, ¶ 36, 301 P.3d 75,
87 (Wyo. 2013) (concluding that the Legislature’s 2007 amendments “implicitly abrogated early
contrary decisions in the law of eminent domain”).
50

Coronado, 642 P.2d at 433.

Cox, supra note 48, at 144–45; see Saige Albert, Barlow Pipeline Case Settled in Wyo Supreme
Court, Wyoming Livestock Roundup (March 30, 2013), http://www.wylr.net/component/content/
article/252-government/state/4079-barlow-pipeline-case-settled-in-wyo-supreme-court (last visited
Nov. 2013).
51

52

See Cox, supra note 48, at 144–45.

53

Id. at 144.

54

Id.

See, e.g., Coronado, 642 P.2d at 443–44 (reversing and remanding for a new trial after
finding an award to a landowner, which exceeded the amount he claimed, was based on evidence
that did not comply with the “before and after” rule); Cox, supra note 48, at 144.
55

56

Cox, supra note 48, at 248.

Rodney Lang, Comment, Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule
71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 Land and Water L. Rev. 739, 739 (1983).
57

58

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-501 through -817 (2013).

59

See id.
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The Act states that the measure of compensation for a taking of any property is
its fair market value.60 In the case of a partial taking, the measure of compensation
is the “greater of the value of the property rights taken, or the amount by which
the fair market value of the property immediately before the taking exceeds the
fair market value of the remainder immediately after the taking.”61 This section
substantially changed the method for determining the amount of compensation
required for a partial taking. Prior to the passage of the Act, the only method of
valuation of a partial taking was the “before and after” test.62 The Act maintained
this traditional method of valuating partial takings and introduced a new method:
“the value of the property rights taken.”63
The statute later defines “fair market value” as the “price which would be
agreed to by an informed seller who is willing but not obligated to sell, and an
informed buyer who is willing but not obligated to buy” if there is a relevant
market.64 If there is no relevant market, fair market value may be determined by
“any method of valuation that is just and equitable.”65 In L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board
of County Commissioners of the County of Hot Springs, the Wyoming Supreme
Court determined the effect of this section was to “permit the landowner to
establish the appropriate amount of just compensation for a partial taking by
any rational method so long as he is able to introduce competent evidence to
that end.”66 This allowed the landowner to prove the value of his property rights
taken instead of using the “before and after” value.67 These amendments, the
court found, “implicitly abrogated earlier contrary decisions in the law of eminent
domain” that restricted valuation to the “before and after” method.68
For nearly twenty years, the Act remained unchanged. In 2007, the Legislature
enacted a handful of amendments, including one that made significant additions
to the methods a court might use to determine fair market value.69 The Act now
instructs a court to use “generally accepted appraisal techniques,” which may
include the “values paid for transactions of comparable type, size and location by
other public or private entities in arms [sic] length transactions for comparable
60

Id. § 1-26-702.

61

Id. (emphasis added).

Continental Pipeline Co. v. Irwin Livestock Co., 625 P.2d 214, 216 (Wyo. 1981); see supra
notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
62

63
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-702(b) (2013). The term “value” in this section is somewhat
ambiguous. The Greencore court held that “value” in this context means “fair market value.” Barlow
Ranch, LP v. Greencore Pipeline Co., 2013 WY 34, ¶ 25, 301 P.3d 75, 85 (Wyo. 2013).
64

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-704(a)(i) (2013).

65

Id. § 1-26-704(a)(ii).

66

790 P.2d 663, 672 (Wyo. 1990).

67

Id.

68

Id. at 669.

69

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-704 (2013).
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transactions on the same or similar property.”70 It may also include the “price paid
for other comparable easements or leases of comparable type, size and location on
the same or similar property.”71
As the legislators recognized during debate on these amendments, there are
instances when landowners are paid substantial prices for easements.72 It has been
noted that such offers are, in fact, typical.73 Condemnors often offer more than
the fair market value in an attempt to avoid delay, maintain positive relationships,
and to “satisfy the intuitive feelings of landowners that they really have lost
something.”74 The amendments to the Act, the purpose of which were to provide
landowners the ability to present evidence of what other landowners have been
offered for similar easements, are at the heart of the Greencore decision.75
70

Id. § 1-26-704(a)(iii); the full text of the section reads:
(iii) The determination of fair market value shall use generally accepted appraisal
techniques and may include:
(A) The value determined by appraisal of the property performed by a
certified appraiser;
(B) The price paid for other comparable easements or leases of comparable
type, size and location on the same or similar property;
(C) Values paid for transactions of comparable type, size and location by
other public or private entities in arms length transactions for comparable
transactions on the same or similar property.

Id.
71

Id. § 1-26-704(a)(iii)(B).

Debate on House Bill 0124, 59th Leg. Gen. Sess., January 24, 2007, afternoon session,
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2007/audio/AudioMenu/AudioMenu.aspx (Representative Thomas E.
Lubnau said during debate: “In my experience up in my home county negotiating road easements
and pipeline easements for land owners and oil companies, there are occasions where premium deals
work out.”).
72

73

Cox, supra note 48, at 145.

Id.; see Matt Micheli & Mike Smith, The More Things Change, The More Things Stay the
Same: A Practitioner’s Guide to Recent Changes to Wyoming’s Eminent Domain Act, 8 Wyo. L. Rev.
1, 15 (2008); Allen, supra note 40, at 44–45 (explaining that “condemnors, especially private
companies, have been willing to pay extra to landowners in order to move the project along quickly,
encourage good landowner relations, and avoid costs associated with litigation”).
74

75

Debate on House Bill 0124, supra note 72. Representative Kermit C. Brown stated:
I’d ask your favorable consideration for [the amendments regarding comparable
easements and transactions] so that the one poor landowner that ends up in court
isn’t standing there on an island or out on a limb all by himself, without the ability to
make a showing about why he’s holding out, why the price that he is advocating for
is reasonable. He knows some things that he can’t tell the court. The court can’t take
them into consideration. That would be the purpose of this amendment.

Id. While the statements of individual legislators cannot be assumed to be the sentiment of an entire
legislative body, the amendments were debated and passed despite some expressed concerns, as the
Greencore court noted. Barlow Ranch, LP v. Greencore Pipeline Co., 2013 WY 34, ¶ 45, 301 P.3d
75, 89–90 (Wyo. 2013) (citing Kennedy Oil v. Dept. of Revenue, 2008 WY 154, ¶¶ 21–22, 205
P.3d 999, 1006 (Wyo. 2008)).
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Principal Case
Background
Greencore Pipeline Company began negotiations in the mid-2000s with over
sixty Wyoming landowners, including Barlow Ranch, seeking easements across
their property in order to construct, operate, and maintain a pipeline.76 Once
completed, the pipeline will transport carbon dioxide from processing plants in
Fremont County, where it is created as a waste product at gas plants, to southeastern
Montana, where it will be injected into oil wells for enhanced oil recovery.77 While
Greencore reached agreements with sixty-three of the landowners for purchase
of easements, it was unsuccessful in negotiations with Barlow.78 Consequently,
Greencore deposited with the district court the amount of its final purchase offer
to Barlow and filed a condemnation action.79
After Greencore filed its complaint, the parties stipulated that Greencore
could obtain the easements by condemnation. However, they left the question
of compensation unresolved.80 Based on evidence Greencore presented showing
what it paid for a similarly situated easement nearby, the district court found the
Barlow’s easement was worth $43,034.81 Both parties appealed.82 The Wyoming
Supreme Court considered multiple issues on appeal, one of which is relevant to
this Case Note: whether comparable easements are proper evidence to establish
the value of a partial taking of real property for a pipeline easement under the
Eminent Domain Act.83
76

Greencore, ¶¶ 6–7, 301 P.3d at 80.

Brief for the Appellant at 4, Barlow Ranch, LP v. Greencore Pipeline Co., 2013 WY 34,
301 P.3d 75 (2013), (S-12-0038); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Barlow Ranch, LP v.
Greencore Pipeline Co., No. 31771 at 1–2 (Wyo. Dist. Dec. 28, 2011).
77

Greencore, ¶ 7, 301 P.3d at 80. Greencore was also unsuccessful in reaching an agreement
with Joseph C. Maycock, Brown-Kennedy Ranch, or Mitchel M. Maycock and Dixie Lea Maycock,
who brought the action as Trustees of the Mitchel M. Maycock Revocable Trust and Trustees of the
Dixie Lea Maycock Revocable Trust. Id. However, because these parties did not appeal the district
court ruling, the following analysis focuses solely on Barlow Ranch.
78

79
Id. at ¶ 8, 301 P.3d at 80–81. The actual amount Greencore deposited was $136,323.83,
the combined total of its final purchase offers to Barlow, the Maycocks and the Brown-Kennedy
Ranch. Id. Wyoming statutes require a condemnor to deposit with the court an amount equal to
the condemnor’s last offer of settlement prior to the action at the time of commencing an eminent
domain action. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-513 (2013).
80
Greencore, ¶ 8–9, 301 P.3d at 80–81. The pipeline easement to which the parties agreed
was 860.679 rods, or about 4,734 feet in length, with a construction easement 100 feet wide and a
permanent easement 50 feet wide. Findings of Fact, supra note 77, at 2.
81

Greencore, ¶ 12, 301 P.3d at 81–82.

82

Id. at ¶ 13, 301 P.3d at 82.

83

Id. at ¶ 5, 301 P.3d at 80. The full list of issues the court addressed were:
(1) Did the district court err by concluding comparable easements were proper evidence
to establish the value of a partial taking of real property for a pipeline easement?
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Admissibility of Comparable Easements
Greencore asked the Wyoming Supreme Court to address whether comparable
easements are admissible under the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act to establish
the value of a partial taking of real property for a pipeline easement.84 After an
analysis of the applicable sections of the Act, read in pari materia, the court found
that a trial court may admit and consider evidence of comparable easements
when determining the value of the easement.85 The court found that the language
“comparable easements” clearly indicated the Legislature intended the section
to apply to partial takings of easements.86 Accordingly, the court upheld the
district court ruling that the Act permits the district court to consider comparable
easements in determining just compensation of a partial taking.87
The court then turned its attention to the type of easement and transaction
that could be admitted under the amended statutes.88 Barlow contended the
district court judge erred in refusing to admit twelve easements of comparable
type, size and location, which Barlow offered as evidence of fair market value
as defined by the Act.89 Using these easements, Barlow’s appraiser calculated
the fair market value of the pipeline easement at twenty-five dollars per rod
with an additional annual payment of three dollars per rod, adjusted annually
for inflation.90
(2) Did the district court err when it ruled the easements offered by Barlow as
comparables were not the result of arms’ length transactions?
(3) Did the district court err in concluding the pipeline easements offered by Barlow
were not comparable to the Greencore easement pursuant to [Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 1-26-704(a)(iii)(B)-(C)]?
(4) Did the district court err in concluding annual payments for a condemned
easement are not permissible under Wyoming law?
(5) Did the district court err when it refused to rule that Greencore was entitled to
abandon its pipeline in place when its need for it terminates?
Id.
84

Id. at ¶ 15, 301 P.3d at 82–83.

Id. at ¶¶ 18–54, 301 P.3d at 84–93. In pari materia is a canon of statutory interpretation
which requires that statutes that relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose are to
be considered and construed in harmony. See, e.g., Sorensen v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 2010 WY
101, ¶ 13, 234 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Wyo. 2010); In re Loberg, 2004 WY 48, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d 1045, 1048
(Wyo. 2004).
85

86

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-704(a)(iii)(B) (2013).

87

See Greencore, ¶ 50, 301 P.3d at 91.

88

Id. at ¶ 51, 301 P.3d at 91.

89

Id. at ¶ 51, 301 P.3d at 90–91.

A rod is a measurement of length equal to 5½ yards or 16½ feet. The Consumer Price
Index, which was used by the court to track inflation, is the “measure of the average change over time
in the prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services.” U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm#Question_1.
90

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss1/5

12

Schreiber: Property Law - Strong Armed at Arm's Length: The Role of Comparab

2014

Case Note

147

Greencore challenged this appraisal, arguing that the only measure of
damages in a condemnation action for the partial taking of property is the
difference between “before and after” values of the property taken.91 Greencore
further contended “that evidence of prices paid for comparable easements was not
admissible to show fair market value in the context of partial takings.”92 Greencore
filed an affidavit from its own appraiser, who believed the fair market value for
a fee simple interest in the property sought for the pipeline would be $325 per
acre.93 This value would have led to a lower value for the easement overall than the
values that Barlow’s appraiser introduced.94
In response to these arguments, the district court held that evidence of the
values of other easements was permissible, but only if the other easements were
comparable and the result of arm’s length transactions.95 Ultimately, the district
court found that the easements Barlow submitted were neither comparable nor
the result of arm’s length transactions.96 The court based its holding on the fact
that Barlow’s easements were for pipelines that had to cross onto Barlow’s property
to connect to other pipelines and compressor facilities and because some of them
were “negotiated in an effort to placate Barlow so future dealings would go more
smoothly.”97 As a result, there was “insufficient evidence to establish that both
sides were under no obligation to obtain the easements, or that the motivations
and pressures there were the same as the motivations here.”98 The district court
judge instead relied on the evidence Greencore submitted, concluding that the
value of the Barlow easement was fifty dollars per rod, for a total of $43,034.99
In reviewing this decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court first addressed
the district court’s dismissal of Barlow’s evidence and whether these easements
were the result of arm’s length transactions.100 The court determined that the
91

Greencore, ¶ 11, 301 P.3d at 81.

92

Id.

93

Id.

See id. It is impossible to say what compensation would be under Barlow’s appraisal.
Because annual payments are part of the valuation, compensation depends on the lifetime of the
pipeline. It seems safe to assume, however, that Barlow would not have filed an appeal if there were
not a substantial difference between what he introduced as fair market value and what the trial
court awarded.
94

95

Id. at ¶ 12, 301 P.3d at 81–82.

96

Id.

97

Findings of Fact, supra note 77, at 5.

98

Id. at 6.

Greencore, ¶ 12, 301 P.3d at 81–82; These easements showed that, for the pipeline in
question, it had paid sixty-three other landowners, including a landowner just west of Barlow,
between forty-nine and fifty-five dollars per rod, with an average of fifty dollars per rod. Id. at
¶ 83, 301 P.3d at 100. The values paid for these other easements were lump sum values and did not
include annual payments. Id.
99

100

Id. at ¶ 55, 301 P.3d at 93.
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Act “incorporates the principle that fair market value and comparable sales must
be based upon arms’ length transactions between willing buyers and willing
sellers.”101 A transaction is not arm’s length if there is “compulsion either on the
part of the seller who is obliged to act or on the part of the purchaser, who for
personal reasons or necessities, is compelled to pay a higher price than an ordinary
purchaser would be willing to pay.”102 Furthermore, an arm’s length transaction is
presumed unless there is evidence showing anything contrary.103
After noting that prices paid during condemnation proceedings or under
actual threat of condemnation are not arm’s length transactions and are therefore
inadmissible in court as comparable easements, the court concluded that this
does not exclude any and all transactions made by an entity with the power
of condemnation.104 The court held the values were admissible so long as the
transaction was fair and met all other standards of comparability.105 In sum, so
long as a transaction is not made during a condemnation proceeding, or under
the threat of condemnation, the value of the transaction may be admitted as
evidence of fair market value.106
Applying this reasoning, the court rejected the district court’s conclusion
that the easements Barlow offered as evidence were not a result of arm’s length
transactions.107 In ruling they were inadmissible, the district court relied on a
rule established in Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves: a sale is not arm’s length when
the easement is placed in a required location.108 In Coronado, an oil company
sought an easement on a private road, which was the only means of access to
a drilling site.109 Because the only options for the oil company were to either
pay the landowner’s demand or condemn the property right of way for the road,
the Coronado court held the transaction was not arm’s length nor was the price
indicative of fair market value.110

101
Id. at ¶ 56, 301 P.3d at 94; see supra note 70 and accompanying text; Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 1-26-704 (2013).
102
Id. at ¶ 57, 301 P.3d at 94 (quoting 5 Nichols
§ 21.02[5] (Matthew Bender, 3rd ed.)).
103

Id.

104

Id. at ¶ 58, 301 P.3d at 94.

on

Eminent Domain, Ch. CT21,

Id. The court provided no guidance to lower courts regarding what constitutes a “fair”
transaction. Id.
105

106

Id.

107

Id. at ¶ 74, 301 P.3d at 98.

108

See Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 439–40 (Wyo. 1982).

109

Id. at 440.

110

Greencore, ¶ 60, 301 P.3d at 95.
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However, this rule was created prior to the adoption the Act, and because it
was seemingly contrary to its purpose, the Greencore court overruled it.111 While a
condemnor may identify an easement across a landowner’s property as a necessary
part of a larger pre-determined system, the court held that this does not mean that
the location is “required.”112 The court continued:
We do not believe the Legislature intended that a proposed
easement be rejected as an appropriate comparable [easement]
simply because it is part of a larger project or the location chosen
by the company was the most expeditious, shortest or most cost
effective. If that were true, the project developer would possess
nearly unlimited power to determine the location was “required”
and most mineral development easements would be excluded as
comparables, in direct contradiction of the statutory directive to
use comparable easements to establish fair market value.113
The court concluded that the “rule requires actual condemnation or threat of
condemnation to bar use as a comparable sale.”114
Secondly, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding the
transactions were not arm’s length because there was no evidence Barlow had been
placated.115 While the record reflected a desire by the company representatives
to “maintain an amicable relationship with landowners,” the Court found no
evidence showing that company representatives paid Barlow a “premium” to
avoid condemnation or to appease him.116 The proposition that the existence of
an ongoing relationship between buyer and seller negates the arm’s length nature
of the transaction runs contrary to the purpose of the Act, the court held, which
specifically permits consideration of easements on the same or similar property.117
On remand, the court instructed the district court to “analyze the proffered
easements to determine whether they are comparable under the appropriate
standards.”118 These standards include considering whether the transactions

111
Id. at ¶ 61, 301 P.3d at 95. In order to give effect to the legislature’s intent to “use the
market for comparable easements as a tool to determine fair market value in pipeline condemnation
cases” the court “reject[ed] Coronado’s statement that a transaction is not arms’ [sic] length simply
because the project developer “requires” the easement be placed in a certain location.” Id.
112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id. at ¶ 64, 301 P.3d at 96.

115

Id. at ¶ 74, 301 P.3d at 98.

116

Id.

117

Id.; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-704(a)(iii)(B)-(C) (2013).

118

Greencore, ¶ 103, 301 P.3d at 105.
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were arm’s length under the court’s interpretation.119 In other words, so long as
they were not made under the threat of condemnation or during condemnation
proceedings, the district court may consider the easements as evidence of fair
market value.120

Analysis
While the Greencore court correctly held that comparable easements are
admissible in determining fair market value under Wyoming law, the reasoning used
was incomplete and partially incorrect.121 In holding that arm’s length transactions
may include those transactions in which one party is vested with the power of eminent
domain, so long as they are not determined under the threat of condemnation or
during condemnation proceedings, the court established a rule that will ultimately
harm landowners.122 The 2007 amendments, coupled with the Greencore decision,
will create in private condemnors an incentive to threaten condemnation at the
beginning of negotiations, will discourage condemnors from making substantial
offers to landowners, and will increase condemnation litigation.123

The Question of Comparability
The Greencore court correctly held that consideration of comparable easements
is a permissible method of determining fair market value for a partial taking under
the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act.124 The amendments made to the Act in
2007 explicitly permit a court to consider comparable easements and transactions
to determine the fair market value of a partial or complete taking.125 The plain
language of the statute, paired with the legislative history and intent, shows that
the Legislature intended to permit comparable easements in determining just
compensation for a partial taking.126
However, as previous cases illustrate, determining just compensation,
even with statutory guidance, is a difficult and controversial task.127 The 2007
amendments only complicated the process further.128 The Legislature provided no
119

See id.

120

Id. at ¶ 64, 301 P.3d at 96.

121

See infra notes 124–139 and accompanying text.

122

See infra notes 136 –196 and accompanying text.

123

See infra notes 166–90 and accompanying text.

124

See infra notes 125 –126 and accompanying text.

125

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-704 (2013).

126

See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 60–75 and accompanying text; see, e.g., L.U. Sheep Co. v. Bd. Of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 790 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 1990); Continental Pipeline Co. v. Irwin Livestock Co., 625 P.2d
214, 216 (Wyo. 1981); Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406 (Wyo. 1979).
127

128

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-704(a)(iii)(B)-(C).
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guidance as to what constitutes a comparable easement, other than to require it be
similar in size, type, and location and that the transaction be “arm’s length.”129 The
Legislature did not include a definition of the phrase “arm’s length transaction” in
the 2007 amendments, leaving the task to the court.130
Though the Wyoming Supreme Court had not explicitly defined “arm’s
length transaction” prior to the Greencore decision, the term appears elsewhere in
Wyoming statutes.131 Taxation and revenue laws provide this explanation:
‘Bona fide arm’s-length sale’ means a transaction in cash or terms
equivalent to cash for specified property rights after reasonable
exposure in a competitive market between a willing, well
informed and prudent buyer and seller with adverse economic
interests and assuming neither party is acting under undue
compulsion or duress[.]132
Unsurprisingly, the Greencore court adopted a similar definition, holding that a
transaction is not arm’s length if there is “compulsion on the seller who is obliged
to act or on the part of the purchaser, who for personal reasons or necessities,
is compelled to pay a higher price than an ordinary purchaser would be willing
to pay.”133 The court recognized a well-settled principle that “prices paid in
condemnation actions or under actual threat of condemnation are not proper
comparable sales because they are not arms’ [sic] length transactions.”134 The
court nevertheless held that the mere fact that one party was vested with the
power of eminent domain does not mean the transaction was inherently unfair
or necessarily precluded as evidence of a comparable sale.135 Instead, the district
court may consider transactions in which a party is vested with eminent domain,
so long as the other statutory requirements are satisfied.136
The question then becomes, under what circumstances is a transaction, in
which one party is vested with the power of eminent domain, not reached under
the threat of condemnation? On remand, the Greencore court directed the district
129

Id.

130

See id.

See Greencore, ¶ 57, 301 P.3d at 95 (citing no judicial authority for the definition of “arm’s
length transaction”). The author, after an extensive search, was unable to locate any Wyoming
Supreme Court cases that set forth a definition.
131

132
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-501 (2013). This law was originally passed in 1999. 1999 Wyo.
Sess. Laws 59.
133

Greencore, ¶ 57, 301 P.3d at 95; see supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.

Greencore, ¶ 64, 301 P.3d at 96 (citing City of Cheyenne v. Frangos, 487 P.2d 804, 805–06
(Wyo. 1971); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Uinta Dev. Co., 364 P.2d 655, 659 (Wyo. 1961).
134

135

Greencore, ¶ 64, 301 P.3d at 96.

136

Id. at ¶ 103, 301 P.3d at 105; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-704 (2013).
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court to determine whether the easements offered by Barlow were comparable
under the standards set forth in the decision.137 In making this determination, the
district court must consider whether the transaction is arm’s length as the court
defined the term.138 If any of the values for Barlow’s easements were reached under
the threat of condemnation or during a condemnation proceeding, they would be
inadmissible.139 The question for the trial court will be to determine the meaning
of “threat of condemnation.”

The Effects of the Amendments and the Greencore Decision
While the court found the legislative intent in passing the 2007 amendments
was to “encourage private negotiations and agreements,” this is unlikely to be
the outcome of the Greencore decision.140 Instead, the decision will create in
private condemnors an incentive to threaten condemnation at the beginning of
negotiations.141 Furthermore, offers made to landowners as part of negotiations
will decrease.142 Finally, the decision will increase litigation of takings.143
There are many reasons a pipeline company may pay a landowner a substantial
price beyond the fair market value for an easement, including economic necessity,
opportunity costs, the desire to avoid litigation, or to maintain a positive working
relationship with landowners.144 Prior to Greencore, private condemnors paid these
sums without anticipating they would eventually be used in court to determine
just compensation for a subsequent condemned easement.145 Following the
Greencore decision, however, these transactions may be admissible so long as they
were not reached under the threat of condemnation.146
One of the most compelling arguments against using comparable easements
acquired by an entity with the power of eminent domain to determine fair market
value is because the buyer is under the threat of condemnation.147 In such a case, the
Greencore, ¶ 53, 301 P.3d at 92 (noting that “each proposed easement transaction should
have been evaluated [by the trial court] to determine whether it was appropriate evidence of fair
market value”).
137

The Greencore court also instructed the trial court to consider whether the comparable
easements were similar in size, type and location as required by the statute. Greencore, ¶ 84, 301 P.3d
at 101.
138

139

Id. at ¶ 64, 301 P.3d at 96.

140

Id.

141

See infra notes 147–160 and accompanying text.

142

See infra notes 161–165 and accompanying text.

143

See infra notes 166–170 and accompanying text.

144

See Micheli & Smith, supra note 74, at 15.

145

See Debate on House Bill 0124, supra note 72; Micheli & Smith, supra note 74, at 15.

146

Greencore, ¶ 64, 301 P.3d at 96.

147

Allen, supra note 40, at 45.
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landowner has no choice but to convey the easement to the entity.148 It is difficult
to imagine a scenario in which a landowner approached by a representative for
a company vested with the power of eminent domain would not feel threatened
or compelled to sell. Simply knowing that the company is vested with the right
would seemingly be enough to render the transaction not arm’s length, and in
Wyoming, a condemnor is required to inform a landowner of this power.149
Under Wyoming law, a condemnor must notify the landowner that it is
vested with the power of eminent domain at the beginning of a negotiation
proceeding.150 The Act states that a condemnor must use “reasonable and diligent
efforts” to acquire a piece of property and “negotiate in good faith.”151 Good
faith negotiations must include providing the landowner with “[a] written notice
that . . . formal legal proceedings may be initiated if negotiations fail.”152 From the
beginning of negotiations, if the condemnor follows procedure required by law,
the landowner is aware that he is dealing with one who has the legal authority to
take his property, regardless of the landowner’s desires or demands.153
If the trial court determines that this notice constitutes a threat of
condemnation, then many, if not most, of the comparable easements that
landowners offer at trial in the future will not be admissible as evidence of fair
market value. Such a result would seriously frustrate the Legislature’s intent to
ensure rewards reached in a condemnation proceeding reflect prices agreed upon
outside of the courtroom. If, on the other hand, this notice is insufficient to
render an arm’s length transaction “under the threat of condemnation,” this will
likely prompt condemnors to explicitly warn a landowner at the beginning of
negotiations that he is being threatened with condemnation.154
Out of fear that these high values may be introduced during a later, and
perhaps unrelated, condemnation proceeding, condemnors may include a threat
of condemnation with any offer, in addition to the notice required by statute.155

Id.; see Laura A. Hanley, Judicial Battles Between Pipeline Companies and Landowners: It’s
Not Necessarily Who Wins, but by How Much, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 125, 159 (2000) (arguing that,
because there is really no question as to whether or not a private condemnor can take the property,
what determines who wins and loses is a question of compensation only).
148

149

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-509(a)-(b) (2013).

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id. § 1-26-509(c)(iii)(F) (emphasis added).

153

See id. § 1-26-509(a)-(b)-(c)(iii)(F).

154

See infra notes 155–160 and accompanying text.

Dave Ditto, New Developments in Wyoming: Compensation for Easements in Eminent Domain
Cases, (May 2013), http://wyia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/dave-ditto.pdf (discussing “steps
to avoid pitfalls” following the Barlow decision with the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority in
Cheyenne, Wyoming on behalf of Associated Legal Group).
155
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Under such circumstances, the transaction would not be arm’s length according
to the Greencore holding and would be inadmissible under Wyoming law.156
This frustrates the legislative intent of the statute in two ways. First, it prevents
admission of the very transactions the Legislature meant to be used during
condemnation proceedings to determine compensation—those that are paid for
easements of comparable size, type and location.157 Second, such threats will turn
existing amicable relations between landowners and condemnors into adversarial
ones. This will discourage negotiations between the parties, in direct contradiction
of legislative intent.158
Arguably, such a threat would not constitute good faith negotiations
as required by state statute.159 The Act states that the condemnor must make
“reasonable and diligent efforts to acquire property by good faith negotiation.”160
However, there is nothing to preclude the use of reasonable and diligent efforts on
the part of the condemnor from occurring under the umbrella of a threat. Such
foreboding may make the transaction uncomfortable, but would not necessarily
render it unreasonable or not diligent.
The second negative consequence of the Greencore decision will be a decrease
in the price of easement offers to landowners during negotiation proceedings.
During debate on the 2007 amendments, this concern was raised.161 One
legislator expressed concern that the practical effect of the amendments admitting
comparable easements and transactions would be that “none of the companies
will negotiate with a landowner because if you cut a deal or a premium deal and
that becomes discoverable, then that is the price.”162 This phenomenon was also
foreseen in an article written in response to the 2007 amendments, in which the
authors argued:
Allowing these other agreements into a condemnation valuation
hearing will ultimately result in a loss to landowners, especially
landowners who are willing to work with condemnors. In the
past, condemnors, especially private companies, have been
willing to pay extra to landowners in order to move the project
along quickly, encourage good landowner relations, and avoid

156
Barlow Ranch, LP v. Greencore Pipeline Co., 2013 WY 34, ¶ 64, 301 P.3d, 75, 96
(Wyo. 2013).
157

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-704(a)(iii)(B)-(C) (2013).

Greencore, ¶ 64, 301 P.3d at 96 (interpreting the purpose of the act be to “encourage private
negotiations and agreements”).
158

159

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-509 (2013).

160

Id.

161

Debate on House Bill 0124, supra note 72.

162

Id.
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costs associated with litigation. If a company feels like those
agreements will be allowed into court and used to value property
taken in a condemnation action, it no longer has the ability to
reward cooperative landowners.163
The solution to this problem is to “not pay anyone a premium to settle
and cooperate.”164
Additionally, in a presentation to the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority, a
Wyoming attorney explicitly advised practitioners: “Do not set a new industry
standard by making higher payments, annual payments, or [consumer price index]
adjustments.”165 During negotiations, landowners will likely find they are not
made the same kind of offers as they were before Greencore. As a result, they may
feel compelled to engage in condemnation proceedings more frequently, thinking
that this will be their way to compensation they see as just. When landowners
do find themselves in court, and are permitted to introduce evidence of values
paid for comparable easements, they may find the prices paid for those easements
have decreased.
Finally, the Greencore decision will likely lead to an increase in condemnation
litigation. Condemnors will be hesitant to make substantial offers to landowners
during negotiations for fear such transactions will be used to determine
compensation in a later transaction.166 For example, a landowner who knows that
his neighbor received a price for an easement (not reached under the threat of
condemnation or during a condemnation proceeding) that was substantially more
than what he has been offered (because the neighbor was especially agreeable or
because the condemnor was under pressure to get the project up and running) has
little incentive to accept the condemnor’s proposed price. Further, the condemnor
has little incentive to match landowner’s demands for fear that the next neighbor
will use these values in court.167 As a result, landowners may find themselves in
courtrooms more frequently.
On the other hand, the Greencore decision may instead encourage companies
to make offers reflective of what would be presented at trial, thereby avoiding
trial altogether. If a company knows that transactions from previous negotiations,
either its own or another company’s, will be introduced during proceedings,
perhaps it will make an offer that is similar to those transactions. If the company
163

See Micheli & Smith, supra note 74, at 21.

164

Id.

165

Ditto, supra note 155.

Micheli & Smith, supra note 74, at 22 (discussing how allowing comparable easements
will decrease incentive for condemnors to make offers to landowners, which will, in turn, encourage litigation).
166

167

Id.
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believes this will be the likely outcome if the case goes to trial, in an effort to save
time and money, perhaps the company will just make that offer initially.
However, such a result is unlikely. Making a substantial offer would increase
the overall payment standard by providing landowners with transactions that can
be used during later condemnation proceedings to prove fair market value.168
Practitioners have been explicitly warned against doing this.169 By either matching
or exceeding offers made in previous arm’s length transactions, companies are
perpetuating the use of these transactions to show fair market value, even though
the values in these previous transactions may be inflated beyond the value of
the property taken.170 The Greencore decision does not encourage negotiations.
It stifles them, thereby creating an incentive in landowners to seek relief in
the courts.

And The Question Lingers: What is Just Compensation?
As the law exists now, landowners will likely suffer harm including reduced
settlement offers, negotiations entered into under the threat of condemnation,
fewer comparable easements of substantial value to present during condemnation
proceedings, and an increase in condemnation litigation.171 There are a number
of ways the Legislature could prevent this harm, including by amending the
Wyoming Eminent Domain Act or the Wyoming Constitution.
First, the Legislature could amend the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act
to remove the requirement that only arm’s length transactions for comparable
easements be admitted to determine compensation. This will likely permit a court
to look to any transaction, thereby expanding the pool of transactions from which
a landowner may pull to prove the value of his property taken.172 Furthermore,
condemnors would no longer have an incentive to threaten condemnation during
negotiations, because the transaction would be admissible regardless of whether it
was made under the threat of condemnation.
However, this change would fail to address another likely outcome of the
Greencore decision: an overall reduction in the prices offered to landowners
from condemnors during negotiations.173 In fact, it may exacerbate the problem
168

See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text.

169

Ditto, supra note 155.

170

Id.

171

See supra notes 143–67 and accompanying text.

The argument has been made that agreements on values of easements reached during
negotiations are settlement agreements and are therefore inadmissible in court under rules of
evidence. If the Legislature were to remove the “arm’s length transaction” requirement, this argument
may be raised with more fervor in the future. Micheli & Smith, supra note 74, at 21–22.
172

173

See supra notes 161– 65 and accompanying text.
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further. With the arm’s length requirement, the company can render a transaction
inadmissible by threatening condemnation. Without it, all transactions are
admissible to prove fair market value. Because of this, condemnors will have
even less incentive to negotiate with landowners. If they do continue to make
substantial offers, it is almost certain that those values will be used against them
in future condemnation proceedings.
Secondly, Wyoming could statutorily require that land be valued above and
beyond fair market value, either because of the nature of the land or because of
the purpose for which it was taken. For example, in Indiana, agricultural land
must be compensated at 125 percent fair market value and residential land must
be compensated at 150 percent of fair market value.174 In contrast, a Rhode
Island statute requires that a landowner whose property is taken for the purpose
of economic development be compensated at least equal to 150 percent of fair
market value.175 A number of states have enacted similar statutes, requiring that
compensation exceed fair market value by a certain percentage.176 The Wyoming
Legislature could do the same, requiring a private condemnor to pay a landowner
150 percent of the “before and after” value the property taken for the purpose of
oil and gas development.177
Finally, the Legislature could revoke the power of eminent domain from the
oil and gas industry.178 This option is obviously politically charged and perhaps
unwise, but worth consideration nevertheless.179 The drafters of the Wyoming

174

Ind. Code. § 32-24-4.5-8 (2013).

175

R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-64.12-8(a) (2013).

Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 523.001, 523.039 (2013) (compensation for a primary residence must
be equal to 125 percent of the property’s fair market value unless it has been “owned within the same
family for fifty or more years.” Then it must be equal to 150 percent of the property’s fair market
value); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-129(a)(2) (2012) (redevelopment agencies must compensate
owners 125 percent of the property’s fair market value).
176

177

See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.

This would likely require a constitutional amendment, which is not an easy task to
accomplish: an amendment must be passed by two-thirds of all the members of each of the two
houses, and then approved by the state electorate. Wyo. Const. art. XX, § 1.
178

179
Klass, supra note 19, at 688 (noting that, because the development of coal, oil, gas and other
mineral resources in many Western states is still so important, efforts to eliminate or significantly limit
authority for natural resources takings will likely meet strong resistance); see Dustin Bleizeffer, Property
Power Struggle, Casper Star-Tribune (Jan. 1, 2007), http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/
property-power-struggle/article_3536c579-15d1-5962-8c9f-188604f48075.html (last visited
November 2013) (reporting on the controversy surrounding the 2007 Wyoming Eminent Domain
Act amendments, noting that the desire to preserve the Act comes from the “very entities that work
the hardest at lobbying state legislators: the oil and gas industry, utilities, municipalities and the state
itself. They say tinkering with eminent domain laws would not only upset decades of case law on the
subject, but would strangle the state’s ability to grow its economy and maintain vital infrastructure
such as highway systems and the power grid.”).
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Constitution granted private entities the power of eminent domain for a public
purpose: to promote settlement and encourage the development of the state’s
natural resources in the early days of statehood.180 However, Wyoming is no
longer in its infancy and the resource extraction industry, especially the oil and
gas industry, is anything but floundering.181 With the words of Justice Holmes in
mind, it is questionable whether such exceptional times now exist that concessions
need be required of landowners so that the “foundations of public welfare” might
be laid.182
In recent years, oil and gas activities have accounted for forty-three percent of
Wyoming’s gross state product and thirty-two percent of the state’s total economic
output.183 The industry also contributes significantly to employment in the
state.184 Oil and gas activities account for twenty percent of the labor force and
generate nearly four billion dollars in labor earnings annually.185 The oil and gas
industry is a “vital and significant economic driver” of the state economy.186 The
power of eminent domain was extended to the oil and gas industry in an effort
to foster economic development.187 However, the industry at this point appears
well developed.188
If the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act and its amendments are any indication,
the Legislature is more concerned with providing landowners just compensation
for takings by private entities than it is with fostering economic development in
the oil and gas sector.189 Allowing landowners to rely on the market to determine
the value of an easement on their property by removing eminent domain from

180
Keiter & Newcomb, supra note 2, at 67; see Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch,
Reservoir, and Irrigation Co., 131 P. 43, 56 (Wyo. 1913) (discussing the importance of the Wyo.
Const. art. 32 and 33 which grant private companies the power of eminent domain in an effort to
irrigate in the arid west).
181

The Wyoming Constitution was ratified in 1889.

Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906); see supra note 1
and accompanying text.
182

183
Holly Wise Bender, et. al., Wyoming Oil and Gas Economic Impact Study, vii (2008), available
at http://www.westernenergyalliance.org/sites/default/files/Wyoming%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20
Economic%20Impact%20Study%20-%202008.PDF%3B.pdf; see Brian Jeffries, Oil, Natural Gas,
Pipelines and Wyoming State Revenue, Wyoming Infrastructure Authority, available at http://
wyopipeline.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/2011-Gas-Fair-Presentation-Jeffries.pdf (2011)
(illustrating that sixty-percent of the annual Wyoming revenue comes from minerals, forty-nine
percent of which is attributable to oil and gas activities).
184

Bender, supra note 183, at vii.
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See supra notes 44 –47 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 51–75 and accompanying text.
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the equation may be the most productive means of doing so.190 This would allow
landowners and companies to negotiate a price for an easement without the threat
of condemnation lingering in the background. Landowners would be able to
demand a price that would compensate them for what they feel they are losing.191
However, there is the valid concern that landowners would hold out, refusing
to sell unless offered an exorbitant price.192 This may be a good reason to continue
to extend the power of eminent domain to the oil and gas industry. Without it,
oil and gas companies might find the costs of negotiating with landowners too
prohibitive to carry on operations in Wyoming.193 In light of this consideration,
perhaps the oil and gas industry must still retain the power to condemn in order
to remain a significant contributor to the state economy.194 Even if this were not
the case, overcoming the political opposition to such a substantial change in the
law is likely to prove difficult, if not impossible.195 As a result, the Legislature
should likely focus its attention instead on amending the Wyoming Eminent
Domain Act in a way that would strike a balance between landowner concerns
and industry interests.196

Conclusion
The Wyoming Legislature amended the state’s eminent domain laws to
permit the admission of comparable easements and transactions to determine
fair market value of condemned easements in an attempt to allow landowners to
show what other landowners had been paid for similar easements.197 Recognizing
this intent, the Wyoming Supreme Court expanded the definition of arm’s
length transactions to include those that involved a party with the power of
eminent domain so long as the transaction was not made under the threat of

Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 Journal of Political
Economy 473, 473 (1976) (arguing that land assembly is not necessarily a more efficient institution
than the free market for consolidating many contiguous but separately owned parcels into a single
ownership unit when one considers the litigation costs of buyer and seller); see William L. Anderson,
The Economic Case Against Eminent Domain, 53 Ideas on Liberty 16, 19 (pointing out that a
forced sale forces the landowner to bear an economic burden when he does not receive the price he
demands, causing the landowner and the community to suffer an economic loss).
190

191

See supra notes 51–75 and accompanying text.

See Anderson, supra note 190, at 18; Micheli & Smith, supra note 74, at 15 (noting that
speculators buy up easement rights with the intention of forcing pipeline, transmission lines and
railroads use negotiated settlement values that have been paid in limited circumstances as a floor for
negotiations for a specific projects).
192
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See Anderson, supra note 190, at 18.
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See id.; Klass, supra note 19, at 688.
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See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-501 through -817.
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See supra notes 84–120 and accompanying text.
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condemnation or during a condemnation proceeding.198 However, rather than
encouraging private negotiations and agreements that lead to just compensation
for landowners, the amendments and Greencore decision are likely to chill
condemnation negotiations, decrease prices offered to landowners for private
takings, and increase condemnation litigation.199 A correction to these problems
will require Legislative action in the form of changes to the Wyoming Eminent
Domain Act, or perhaps, the Wyoming Constitution.200

198

See supra notes 100– 06 and accompanying text.

199

See supra notes 143– 67 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 178–90 and accompanying text.
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